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strategy was to estimate whether an increase in the number of recipients of these scholarships at an 
institution is associated with a decline in the number of students from lower- and lower-middle-income 
families attending the institution, while holding other factors constant. We measured the number of these 
students by the number of Pell Grant recipients attending the institution. 
The second section of our paper briefly describes the National Merit Scholarship and the federal Pell 
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Crafting a Class: The 
Trade-Off between Merit 
Scholarships and Enrolling 
Lower-Income Students
Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Liang Zhang, and Jared M. Levin
INTRODUCTION
One of the strengths of the American higher education system is its com-
petitive nature. Colleges and universities compete for faculty, for students, 
for external research funding and on the athletic fi elds. Given the wide 
publicity that the U.S. News & World Reports annual rankings of colleges 
and universities receive and the importance of student selectivity in these 
rankings, American colleges and universities are increasingly using merit aid 
as a vehicle to attract students with higher test scores and thus to improve 
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their rankings (McPherson & Schapiro, 1998, 2002; Duffy & Goldberg, 1998; 
Ehrenberg, forthcoming).
It is well known that test scores are correlated with students’ socio-eco-
nomic backgrounds. Hence, to the extent that colleges are successful in 
“buying” higher test-score students, one should expect that their enrollment 
of students from families in the lower tails of the family income distribution 
should decline. However, somewhat surprisingly, there have been no efforts 
to test if this is occurring.
Our paper presents such a test. While institutional-level data on the dollar 
amounts of merit scholarships offered by colleges and universities are not 
available, data are available on the number of National Merit Scholarship (NMS) 
winners attending an institution on scholarships that have been funded by 
the institution itself, rather than the National Merit Scholarship Corporation 
(NMSC). These institutional scholarships are awarded to high-test-score 
students only if they attend the institution. Our research strategy was to es-
timate whether an increase in the number of recipients of these scholarships 
at an institution is associated with a decline in the number of students from 
lower- and lower-middle-income families attending the institution, while 
holding other factors constant. We measured the number of these students 
by the number of Pell Grant recipients attending the institution.
The second section of our paper briefl y describes the National Merit 
Scholarship and the federal Pell Grant programs. Next, we describe our 
analytical approach, followed by our empirical fi ndings and some brief 
concluding remarks.
THE NATIONAL MERIT SCHOLARSHIP AND PELL GRANT PROGRAMS
The National Merit Scholarship Program (www.nationalmerit.org) began 
in 1955. High school students qualify for awards based on their scores on the 
PSAT examination, high school records, letters of recommendation, infor-
mation about the students’ activities and leadership, and personal essays. 
Three types of NMS awards exist. The fi rst is a set of scholarships awarded to 
top students independent of family fi nancial circumstances by the NMSC 
itself; these awards currently are $2,500 scholarships for one year of college at only 
institutions to which the winner has been admitted. The second is a set of 
scholarships awarded by corporations to top students who are employees of the 
corporations, children of employees, residents of a community in which the 
corporations have operations, or students pursuing college majors or careers 
in which the corporations have a special interest. These scholarships may 
either be for one year of study or can be renewable for four years. Again there 
is no restriction on the college or university that the student may attend.
The fi nal type, and the focus of our attention, is the NMS awards funded 
by colleges and universities. Finalists in the NMS competition notify the 
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NMSC of their fi rst-choice college or university, and the NSMC in turn 
notifi es the institution. Each institution that offers this type of award makes 
awards to a subset of the fi nalists who have indicated that they wish to attend 
the institution. Crucially, an award is cancelled if the student decides not 
to attend the institution. Hence, these awards are contingent on attending 
the institution.
These college- and university-funded awards are renewable for up to 
four years of undergraduate study and provide stipends that range from 
$500 to $2,000 a year. Awards of this amount pale when compared to the 
$30,000 tuition and fee levels that are now common at the nation’s most 
selective private colleges and universities. However, previous research has 
indicated that offering a top student a named scholarship enhances the 
likelihood that a student will attend an institution (Avery & Hoxby, 2004). 
In addition, it is likely that institutions offering NMS awards will also of-
fer additional merit aid to students; hence, the dollar amount of the NMS 
awards likely understates the amount of merit aid that the recipients receive 
from the institution.
Table 1 provides information on the total number of NMS awards and 
the number of these awards funded by colleges and universities, provided to 
1983 5566 2,382 42.8 4330 1796 41.5
1987 6127 2,976 48.6 4844 2214 45.7
1991 6552 3,463 52.9 4982 2489 50.0
1995 7030 3,975 56.5 5496 2951 53.7
1999 8081 4,582 56.7 6594 3660 55.5
2003 8254 4,670 56.6 6965 3856 55.4
a The National Merit Scholarship Corporation provided data on the number of National 
Merit Scholarship students by institution for 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 
and 2003. The Chronicle of Higher Education publishes the top X institutions (where X var-
ies across years from 30 to 100) that enroll the most National Merit Scholarship students 
in many years. Because of the changing coverage, we have not used the Chronicle’s data.
b We determined the top 100 institutions by the total number of merit NMS students in an institution 
in 2003; these institutions are not necessarily the top 100 in earlier years. These institutions enroll about 
80% of all NMS (ranging from 78% in 1983 to 84% in 2003).
TABLE 1
NUMBER OF TOTAL AND INSTITUTION-FUNDED
NATIONAL MERIT SCHOLARSHIP STUDENTSa
  All Institutions                   Top 100 Institutionsb
Year  Total          Institution          Percent           Total          Institution          Percent
                             Funded           Institution                             Funded           Institution  
               Funded                 Funded 
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us by NMSC for selected academic years between 1983 and 2003. The total 
number of NMS awards grew from 5,566 in 1983 to 8,244 in 2003. As the 
third column indicates, the percentage of these awards funded by colleges 
and universities increased from 42.8% in 1983 to 56.5% in 1995 and has 
remained at about that percentage since then.
NMS awards are heavily concentrated among a small number of our 
nation’s 3,500-plus colleges and universities. Our econometric research 
analyzes panel data for the 100 colleges and universities with the most new 
NMS winners attending them in 2003. The names of the institutions and 
their number of NMS winners in 2003 appear in the appendix. (The sample 
actually contains 103 institutions because of a tie for 100th place.)
These top 100 institutions enrolled about 84% of all of the NMS winners 
in 2003 with somewhat lower percentages in the earlier years.1 Many of these 
institutions are among the small number of colleges and universities that 
still employ need-blind admissions and need-based fi nancial aid policies. A 
number of them accordingly offer no college- and university-funded NMS 
awards. However, even in this group of 100 institutions, the percentage of 
NMS awards funded by the institutions themselves rose from 41.5% in 1983 
to about 55.5% at the turn of the 21st century.
Table 2 provides information for each year during our sample period 
on the numbers of institution-funded and noninstitution-funded NMS 
students at these institutions at the 25th percentile, 50th percentile (me-
dian), 75th percentile, and mean institution in our top 100 sample. The total 
number of NMS students increases at each point in the distribution; this 
increase is at least partially due to the way the institutions were selected (top 
100 in 2003). What stands out, however, is that virtually all of the growth in 
the number of NMS winners occurred in the institution-funded category. 
For example, the mean number of institutional funded awards in the sample 
rose from 17 in 1983 to 37 in 2003. As late as 1995–1996, the 25th percentile 
institution (in terms of total number of NMS awards in 2003) offered no 
institution-funded NMS awards. By 2003–2004, however, the 25th percentile 
institution in the group offered 12 institutionally funded NMS awards.
Our interest is in how the growth of merit scholarships has infl uenced 
the proportion of students from lower- and lower-middle-income families 
attending selective institutions. While the U.S. Department of Education 
does not collect institution-level data on the family income distribution of 
students, data on the number of Pell Grant recipients at each institution 
are collected annually.
1The lower enrollment shares in earlier years are an artifact of how the  panel was con-
structed. This occurs because there is some variation in the institutions that appear in the 
top 100 list from year to year.
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1983–84 12 24 47 42 0 5 20 17 5 10 29 25
1987–88 20 30 52 47 0 14 26 21 5 9 29 26
1991–92 20 32 55 48 0 16 34 24 6 12 24 24
1995–96 23 36 57 53 0 20 36 29 5 12 23 25
1999–00 28 41 85 64 6 25 41 36 6 15 31 28
2003–04 29 44 77 68 12 26 40 37 7 14 33 30
TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONAL MERIT SCHOLARSHIP STUDENTS AT THE TOP 100
INSTITUTIONS: BY SOURCE OF SPONSORSHIP
                   All                                Institution Funded                               Non-Institution Funded
Year         25th          50th          75th          mean 25th          50th          75th          mean         25th           50th          75th          mean
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The Pell Grant program is the largest need-based fi nancial aid program 
in the United States; it provided about $12.6 billion dollars in funding to 
5.1 million undergraduate students in 2003–2004 (Trends, 2004, tables 1, 3). 
Eligibility for Pell Grants for a dependent student is based on a dependent 
student’s family income and wealth, the number of siblings in college, and 
the expected costs of attending the institution; for independent students, 
eligibility is based on the income of the student and his or her spouse. Ac-
cording to Neil Seftor and Sarah Turner (2002), throughout the 1990s, half 
of Pell Grant recipients were independent students, although this fraction 
is likely to be much lower in the selective institutions that are in our sample 
where most students are full-time students. Prior to 1993, awards were also 
constrained to be less than 60% of the costs of attending an institution. 
Some students who attended low-cost institutions were excluded from 
participating in the Pell Grant program for this reason.
Data from the 2002–2003 Title IV/Federal Pell Grant Program End-of-Year 
Report indicate that in that academic year, 87% of all Pell Grant recipients 
at four-year public institutions came from families with family incomes 
of $40,000 or less; the comparable fi gure at four-year private institutions 
was 86.6% (2002–2003 Title IV, Table 2A). Hence, the share of Pell Grant 
recipients among an institution’s undergraduate student body is a good 
proxy for the share of its students coming from lower- and lower-middle-
income families. Jeffrey Tebbs and Sarah Turner (2005) caution that the 
Pell Grant recipient data refer to students attending an institution anytime 
during a year, while IPEDs enrollment data refer to a point of time in the 
fall. Hence, other factors held constant, if turnover of students is high at 
an institution during the year, the “share” of Pell Grant recipients at the 
institution will appear artifi cially high. We control for this problem in the 
empirical work that follows by including institutional fi xed effects in our 
estimation models.
Table 3 presents information, by year, on the mean ratio of the number 
of Pell Grant recipients at an institution to the number of full-time under-
graduates attending the institution for the 100 institutions in our sample 
during the 1983 to 2000 period. The column headed “unweighted” presents 
information on the average percentage across institution, while the col-
umn headed “weighted” is a weighted average, with the enrollments used 
as weights. These data suggest that the percentage of Pell Grant recipients 
among the undergraduate students at these institutions fl uctuated but 
gradually increased during the period.2
2We caution the reader that part-time students attending at least half-time are eligible for 
Pell Grants. However, the 2002-2003 Title IV/Federal Pell Grant Program End-of-Year Report 
(Table 13) indicates that 86.9% of the Pell Grant recipients attending public four-year institu-
tions and 87.8% of the Pell Grant recipients attending private four-year institutions were
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This increase tells us little about the impact of the growth of institutionally 
funded NMS at these institutions on the number of Pell Grant recipients at 
the institutions during the period; the share of Pell Grant recipients at these 
1983 18.60 21.16
1984 18.32 21.02
1985 18.23 21.12
1986 15.94 18.67
1987 16.58 19.77
1988 19.50 23.14
1989 19.75 23.42
1990 19.34 23.21
1991 21.30 25.56
1992 22.64 27.32
1993 21.98 25.89
1994 22.05 26.01
1995 21.71 25.60
1996 21.72 25.75
1997 21.72 25.79
1998 21.95 26.24
1999b 20.05 23.97
2000 19.22 23.19
a The Pell Grant data are from the Federal Pell Grant Program administered by the Department 
of Education. We received data from the Department of Education for academic years 1983–1984 
to 2003–2004 on the number of students receiving Pell Grants and total amount of Pell Grants 
received at each Title IV institution each year during the period.  Data on the number of full-time 
undergraduates enrolled at each institution and the number of full-time fi rst-time freshman at 
each institution are from Webcaspar (http:// caspar.nsf.gov). The percentage of Pell Grant recipi-
ents at an institution in a year is 100 times the number of Pell Grant recipients at the institution in 
the year divided by the number of full-time undergraduates enrolled at the institution in a year.
b Webcaspar did not provide 1999 enrollment data, so we used the average of the 1998 and 2000 fi gures 
for that year.
TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE OF FULL-TIME UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS 
THAT ARE PELL GRANT RECIPIENTS AT THE TOP 100 INSTITUTIONSa
(AS DEFINED IN TABLE 1)
Year   Unweighted   Weighted
full-time students that year. For the institutions in our sample, part-time students represent 
only 12.6% of all students, and using total undergraduate students in the denominator of 
our ratio does not change the trends reported above or any of the econometric results that 
follow. We also caution that only U.S. citizens and permanent residents are eligible for Pell 
Grants. Thus, if an institution enrolls a high fraction of foreign students, its Pell Grant ratio 
will, other factors held constant, appear low.
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institutions will vary over time as the income distribution of the popula-
tions changes, as eligibility rules change, as maximum award levels change 
and as tuition levels at the institutions change. Hence, to analyze the impact 
of changes in the number of NMS recipients on the number of Pell Grant 
recipients, we must control for these other factors in our analyses.
ANALYTIC APPROACH
Our goal is to see how the number of institutionally fi nanced new NMS 
winners (M
t
) at an institution infl uence the number of Pell Grant recipi-
ents (P
t
) at the institution, other factors being held constant. A problem 
that immediately presents itself is that the number of NMS winners refers 
to entering fi rst-year students, while the number of Pell Grant recipients 
refers to all enrolled undergraduates. If we had data on the number of Pell 
Grant recipients who were fi rst-year students at an institution, we would use 
this information and information on the number of new fi rst-year students 
at the institution to construct the fraction of fi rst-year students who were 
Pell Grant recipients at the institution and then estimate how changes in 
the number of NMS winners affected that ratio. However, Pell Grant data 
are not available at the institutional level by the year that the student is 
enrolled in college.
A solution to this problem is possible if we make some very strong and 
admittedly unrealistic assumptions. Specifi cally, if one is willing to assume 
for simplicity that all students at the institution enter as fi rst-year students, 
that no students drop out before graduation, that students’ Pell Grant 
eligibility does not change during the years they are enrolled in college, 
and that all students who graduate do so in four years, then the following 
relationship holds
(1) P
it 
= p
it 
+ p
it-1 
+ p
it-2 
+ p
it-3. 
Here p
it 
is the number of new fi rst-year Pell Grant recipients who enroll at 
the institution in year t. Put simply, the total number of Pell Grant recipients 
at the institution in year t is the sum of the number of new fi rst-year Pell 
grant recipients that enrolled at the institution in year t and in each of the 
three preceding years. If one writes down the equivalent expression for P
it-1 
and then subtracts it from P
it
, one fi nds that
(2) P
it 
– P
it-1 
= p
it 
– p
it-4.
Given the assumptions that we have made, the difference between the 
number of Pell Grant recipients at an institution in year t and year t-1 is the 
difference between the numbers of fi rst-year Pell Grant recipients in year t 
and year t-4. Hence, if we want to estimate how changes in the number of 
NMS infl uence changes in the number of Pell Grant recipients at the institu-
tion between years t and t-1, the correct change in the number of NMS win-
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ners to use is the difference between M
t 
and M
t-4
. So the dependent variable 
in our econometric analyses is based on one-year changes in the numbers of 
Pell Grant recipients, while our explanatory variable is based on four-year 
changes in the number of institutionally funded NMS winners.
Our empirical approach is to use our institutional-level panel data to 
estimate equations in which the one-year change in the ratio of the number 
of Pell Grant recipients to the number of full-time undergraduate students 
at an institution is specifi ed as a linear function of the four-year change in 
the share of fi rst-year full-time undergraduate students who receive institu-
tionally fi nanced NMS awards at the institution, institutional fi xed effects, 
year fi xed effects, and a random error term.
(3) (P
it
/F
it
) – (P
it-1
/F
it-1
) = a
0
 + a
1
 ((M
it
/N
it
) – (M
it-4
/N
it-4
)) + u
i 
+ v
t 
+ e
it
Here F
it
 is the number of full-time enrolled undergraduates at institu-
tion i in year t, N
it
 is the number of full-time fi rst-year students enrolled at 
institution i in year t, the a
0
 and a
1
 are parameters, the u
i
 are the institutional 
fi xed effects, the v
t 
are the year fi xed effects, and the e
it 
is a random error 
term. We include the institutional fi xed effects in the model to control for 
institution-specifi c factors other than changes in the number of NMS award 
winners that might affect the change in the share of Pell Grant recipients 
at an institution. The year fi xed effects are included to control for changes 
in national factors that might affect the share of Pell Grant recipients over 
time; these factors include changes in the distribution of family income of 
college-age students, changes in Pell Grant eligibility and generosity rules, 
and changes in Pell Grant funding levels. 
The Pell Grant and NMS variables have each been defl ated by a relevant 
size variable (total full-time undergraduate students or total full-time fi rst 
year students) to control for changes in the size of each institution over 
time. Because part-time students enrolled for at least one-half of a normal 
full-time load are eligible to receive Pell Grants, in the empirical work in 
the next section, we also experiment with defl ating the Pell grant and NMS 
variables by the total number of undergraduate students and the total num-
ber of fi rst-year students at the institution.
Finally, we should note that our use of the one-year change in the number 
of Pell Grant recipients at an institution to measure the four-year change in 
the number of freshman Pell Grant recipients at an institution will probably 
be subject to substantial measurement error because of the set of strict as-
sumptions that we had to make to derive this equivalence. However, if the 
measurement error is random, it will only increase the imprecision of our 
estimates; it will not bias the coeffi cient of the NMS variable.
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EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Table 4 summarizes our initial estimates of equation (3). The coeffi cients 
in the table are estimates of the parameter a
1 
that come from four different 
model specifi cations. The fi rst is based on the total number of new NMS 
recipients at an institution, regardless of the source of funding. The second 
is based on the number of institutionally funded NMS recipients. The third 
is based on the number of NMS recipients at the institution who are not 
funded by the institution. The fi nal specifi cation includes both the number 
of institutionally funded NMS and the number of NMS recipients funded 
in other ways as explanatory variables. For each specifi cation, we present 
estimated coeffi cients for models that excluded and included year fi xed 
effects; the estimates are not very sensitive to these variables. The panel 
used in this estimation uses four years of NMS recipient data (1983, 1987, 
1991, and 1995) so we have three change observations for each institution 
in the sample.3
The coeffi cients in row 1 suggest that increasing the ratio of new NMS 
award winners, irrespective of source of funding, at an institution to the size 
of the institution’s fi rst-year full-time student body reduces the ratio of the 
institution’s number of Pell Grant recipients to its full-time undergradu-
ate enrollments. If the sizes of the institution’s fi rst-year full-time student 
body and its full-time undergraduate enrollments remain constant, the 
interpretation of the coeffi cients are that an increase in NMS awards of 10 
at an institution is associated with a reduction in the number of Pell Grant 
recipients at the institution of about two.
When we restrict our attention to the number of institutional funded 
NMS, the magnitude of the reduction is doubled to a reduction of four 
Pell Grant recipients for every 10 additional institutionally funded NMS 
award winners, again holding constant full-time freshman and full-time 
total undergraduate enrollment levels. Indeed, when we restrict our atten-
tion to NMS winners not funded by the institution in row 3, an increase 
in the number of these winners at an institution has no statistically signifi -
cant effect on the number of Pell Grant recipients at the institution. This 
fi nding is confi rmed in the coeffi cients from the last model (row 4). When 
we included both the number of institutionally fi nanced and other NMS 
award recipients as explanatory variables, only increases in the former have 
a negative effect on the number of Pell Grant recipients at the institution. 
3The 2003 data could not be used because IPEDs data are not yet available for full-time, 
fi rst-year students and total full-time undergraduate enrollment for 2002 or 2003. We exclude 
the 1999 data because IPED enrollment data were not collected for that year. However, we 
report below our efforts to include data for 1999 by using the average of the institution’s 
enrollment in 1998 and 2000 as a proxy for its 1999 enrollment level.
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Put simply, in our sample of institutions, other factors held constant, in-
cluding the total full-time undergraduate and fi rst-year enrollment levels, 
offering more institutionally funded NMS awards is associated with fewer 
Pell Grant recipients attending the institution; and the magnitude of the 
reduction is roughly four fewer Pell Grant recipients for each 10 additional 
institutional NMS recipients enrolled at the institution.
Table 5 presents estimates of coeffi cients from the models in Table 4 that 
included year fi xed effects, in which the models were estimated for vari-
ous subgroups of our sample. In particular, we present estimates for the 
entire sample (the same as in table 4), for the top 80 institutions in terms 
of the number of Pell Grant recipients in 2003, for the top 60 institutions, 
for the top 40 institutions, for the top 20 institutions, and for the top 10 
institutions. These analyses confi rm that only the institutionally fi nanced 
and awarded NMS adversely infl uence the number of Pell Grant recipients 
at an institution. However, the magnitude of this displacement effect var-
ies by institution. In particular, the magnitude of the displacement effect 
increases as we move from the top 100 institutions, to the top 80, down 
to the top 10 (in terms of total number of Pell Grant recipients in 2003). 
It is at institutions with the largest number of Pell Grant recipients that 
the displacement of Pell Grant recipients by institutionally funded NMS 
recipients is the largest. Indeed, we cannot reject the hypothesis that, other 
factors held constant, at the top 10 institutions, every additional institution-
(1)Share of Total Merit
t
 - Merit
t-4
 -0.200 (-2.35) -0.171 (-2.16)
(2)Share of Inst.  Merit
t
 - Merit
t-4
 -0.415 (-3.16) -0.409 (-3.38)
(3)Share of Non-inst. Merit
t
 - Merit
t-4
 -0.070 (-0.52) -0.004 (-0.03)
(4)Share of Inst.  Merit
t
 - Merit
t-4
 -0.418 (-3.12) -0.427 (-3.44)
     Share of Non-inst. Merit
t
 - Merit
t-4
 0.018 (0.14) 0.086 (0.69)
     
Year Fixed Effects Included No Yes 
TABLE 4
ESTIMATES OF THE IMPACT OF A CHANGE IN THE SHARE OF 
FRESHMEN AT AN INSTITUTION WHO ARE NATIONAL MERIT 
SCHOLARSHIP WINNERS ON THE CHANGE IN THE SHARE OF 
UNDERGRADUATES AT THE INSTITUTION WHO RECEIVE PELL 
GRANTS: FIXED EFFECTS MODELS
(t STATISTICS)
     Share of Pell Grant Recipients
                     Pell
t
 -Pell
t-1
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(1) Share of Total Merit
t
 - Merit
t-4
 -0.171 (-2.16) -0.176 (-1.91) -0.172 (-1.63)
(2) Share of Inst.  Merit
t
 - Merit
t-4
 -0.409 (-3.38) -0.420 (-3.00) -0.436 (-2.69)
(3) Share of Non-inst. Merit
t
 - Merit
t-4
 -0.004 (-0.03) -0.001 (-0.01) 0.012 (0.07)
(4) Share of Inst.  Merit
t
 - Merit
t-4
 -0.427 (-3.44) -0.442 (-3.08) -0.465 (-2.78)
      Share of Non-inst. Merit
t
 - Merit
t-4
 0.086 (0.69) 0.102 (0.69) 0.122 (0.73)
   
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
(1) Share of Total Merit
t
 - Merit
t-4
 -0.288 (-2.50) -0.397 (-2.14) -0.699 (-2.74)
(2) Share of Inst.  Merit
t
 - Merit
t-4
 -0.551 (-3.25) -0.824 (-2.93) -1.471 (-4.06)
(3) Share of Non-inst. Merit
t
 - Merit
t-4
 -0.130 (-0.65) -0.209 (-0.62) -0.392 (-0.85)
(4) Share of Inst.  Merit
t
 - Merit
t-4
 -0.558 (-3.16) -0.867 (-2.84) -1.465 (-3.77)
      Share of Non-inst. Merit
t
 - Merit
t-4
 0.031 (0.16) 0.129 (0.39) -0.020 (-0.06)
  
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
   TABLE 5
ESTIMATES OF THE IMPACT OF A CHANGE IN THE SHARE OF FRESHMAN AT AN INSTITUTION THAT 
ARE NATIONAL MERIT SCHOLARSHIP WINNERS ON THE CHANGE IN THE SHARE OF 
UNDERGRADUATES AT THE INSTITUTION THAT RECEIVE PELL GRANTS: FIXED EFFECTS MODELS 
ESTIMATED SEPARATELY FOR DIFFERENT SAMPLESa
         Share of Pell Grant Recipients
                       Pell
t
 -Pell
t-1
        Top 100  Top 80  Top 60
         Share of Pell Grant Recipients
                       Pell
t
 -Pell
t-1
           Top 40  Top 20  Top 10
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ally fi nanced NMS recipient who attends the institution is associated with 
one fewer one Pell Grant recipient attending the institution. Four of the top 
10 institutions are selective private universities that have no institutionally 
fi nanced NMS recipients. Four of the other six are fl agship public universi-
ties. (See Appendix.)
Several extensions of our analyses warrant brief mention. First, we repli-
cated the analyses found in Table 5 separately for public and private institu-
tions. The pattern of displacement effects for the private institutions was 
very similar to those for the entire sample; the coeffi cients of the institutional 
NMS variable were indistinguishable for each subgroup between private 
institutions and for the overall sample (reported in Table 5). In contrast, 
the displacement effects of increasing institutional NMS awards at public 
institutions were not signifi cantly different from zero when we used the top 
80 and top 100 samples. This fi nding suggests that, at public institutions that 
are not in the top institutions in 2005 in terms of total NMS recipients, we 
fi nd no evidence that Pell Grant recipients are displaced by institutionally 
funded NMS recipients.
Second, we replicated the analyses found in Table 5, adding data for 
1999 to the sample. Because IPEDS did not collect 1999 enrollment data, 
we estimated the 1999 number of full-time, fi rst-year students for each 
institution by the average of the 1998 and 2000 values of this variable for 
each institution. We found that, even with the measurement error induced 
by this method, our estimates of the displacement effects of increasing the 
number of institutionally sponsored NMS recipients at an institution on 
the number of Pell Grant recipients at the institution were roughly of the 
same order of magnitude as those found in Table 5.
Third, part-time students attending an institution at least half-time 
are eligible to receive Pell Grants. While we do not know the number of 
part-time students at each institution each year who meet this criteria, we 
experimented with either including part-time students in the total enroll-
ment fi gures that make up the denominator of the dependent variable in 
equation (3), including part-time, fi rst-year students in the total fi rst-year 
enrollment fi gure that make up the denominator of the explanatory vari-
ables in equation (3), or doing both simultaneously. None of these changes 
substantially affected the fi ndings that we have reported so far.
Finally, we divided our sample into institutions that experienced increases 
in total full-time enrollments during both the 1987–1991 and 1991–1995 
periods and all other institutions. We estimated variants of the models 
a Using panel data for 1983, 1987, 1991 and 1995
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that underlie Table 4 for both groups. We found that a strong statistically 
signifi cant negative relationship exists between the change in the ratio of 
institutionally funded NMS to the number of full-time, fi rst-year students 
and the change in the ratio of the number of Pell Grant recipients to the 
total full-time undergraduates enrolled at the institution only at the “grow-
ing” ones. Thus, the displacement of Pell Grant recipients by institutionally 
awarded NMS recipients in our sample appears to occur only at institutions 
with growing enrollments and largely refl ects a change in the share of Pell 
Grant recipients in the student body, not always an absolute decline in the 
number of Pell grant recipients.
CONCLUSION
Our study has provided the evidence that, with other factors being held 
constant, an increase in the share of institutionally funded NMS students 
in a college or university’s fi rst-year class is associated with a reduction in 
the share of Pell Grant recipients among the undergraduate student body 
at the institution. The magnitude of this displacement effect is largest at the 
institutions in our sample that enroll the greatest number of NMS students, 
and it occurs primarily in institutions whose enrollment is growing. We 
stress that we have observed this displacement effect, as we expected, only 
for institutionally sponsored NMS; we do not observe any displacement 
of Pell Grant recipients if an institution is able to increase the number of 
NMSC- or company-sponsored recipients that it enrolls. Those NMS win-
ners who receive their awards regardless of their choice of institution do 
not appear to displace any student from lower-income families when they 
enroll at an institution.
While our research has focused only on NMS awards, it highlights the 
trade-off that may exist more broadly between using institutional grant aid 
to craft a more selective student body than would otherwise occur and using 
institutional grant aid to attract more students from families from the lower 
tail of the family income distribution. If selective institutions, especially 
public ones, are committed to serving students from all socioeconomic 
backgrounds, these institutions must track the share of their students who re-
ceive Pell grants and have as goals both socioeconomic diversity and student 
selectivity. Without concerted efforts by these institutions to increase the 
representation of students from lower- and lower-middle-income families 
in their student ranks, current inequalities in the distribution of students 
attending these institutions by family income class are likely to persist or 
worsen over time (Bowen, Kurzweil, & Tobin, 2005). 
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APPENDIX
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES WITH THE 
MOST FRESHMAN NMS IN 2003
Rank    Institution        Total NMS     Sponsored by Institution
1 Harvard University 37 80
2 University of Texas at Austin 258 201
3 Yale University 22 80
4 University of Florida 224 185
5 Stanford University 21 70
6 University of Chicago 182 148
7 Arizona State University 176 153
8 Rice University 173 102
9 University of Oklahoma 170 146
10 Princeton University 165 0
11 Washington University in St. Louis 162 125
12 University of Southern California 161 132
13 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 15 10
14 University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 143 117
14 Vanderbilt University 143 103
16 Brigham Young University 140 97
17 Texas A&M University 137 103
18 New York University 136 115
19 University of California at Los Angeles 125 94
20 Duke University 10 30
21 University of Pennsylvania 10 10
22 Northwestern University 96 53
23 Ohio State University 93 77
23 Purdue University 93 75
25 Carleton College 79 62
26 Georgia Institute of Technology 77 62
27 University of Georgia 75 59
28 Iowa State University 69 55
29 University of California at Berkeley 67 0
30 Michigan State University 60 46
31 University of Arizona 59 47
31 University of Michigan at Ann Arbor 59 0
33 University of California at San Diego 56 38
34 Boston University 54 39
35 Case Western Reserve University 53 28
36 University of Nebraska at Lincoln 52 40
37 Macalaster College 51 48
38 California Institute of Technology 50 0
38 University of Kansas 50 40
40 Johns Hopkins University 49 32
40 University of Tulsa 49 38
40 University of Maryland at College Park 49 34
43 Brown University 47 0
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43 Columbia University 47 0
45 Oberlin College 46 38
45 Tulane University 46 36
47 Dartmouth College 45 0
47 University of Kentucky 45 33
47 University of South Carolina at Columbia 45 34
47 Wheaton College (Ill.) 45 40
51 University of Notre Dame 44 0
51 University of Washington 44 26
53 Harvey Mudd College 43 32
54 Kenyon College 41 33
54 Tufts University 41 37
56 Baylor University 40 31
56 Grinnell College 40 35
56 University of Arkansas at Fayetteville 40 33
56 University of Minnesota-Twin Cities 40 26
60 Cornell University 38 0
60 Emory University 38 27
62 George Washington University 37 32
62 Georgetown University 37 0
62 St. Olaf College 37 31
65 University of Alabama at Tuscaloosa 35 28
66 Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology 34 24
67 Clemson University 33 26
67 Miami University (Ohio) 33 26
67 University of Central Florida 33 28
67 University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 33 0
67 University of Virginia 33 0
72 Louisiana State University at Baton Rouge 32 25
72 University of Mississippi 32 24
74 Brandeis University 31 24
74 Furman University 31 29
74 University of Miami 31 22
74 University of Texas at Dallas 31 28
78 Carnegie Mellon University 29 0
78 North Carolina State University 29 21
80 Auburn University 28 20
80 University of Wisconsin at Madison 28 4
82 University of Houston 27 25
83 Williams College 26 0
84 Amherst College 25 0
84 University of California at Irvine 25 20
86 Mississippi State University 24 21
86 University of Tennessee at Knoxville 24 20
88 Bowdoin College 23 21
88 Pomona College 23 6
88 University of Iowa 23 19
88 University of Utah 23 17
Rank    Institution        Total NMS     Sponsored by Institution
Appendix, cont.
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88 Washington and Lee University 23 13
93 Swarthmore College 21 0
93 University of Rochester 21 18
93 University of South Florida 21 17
93 Virginia Tech 21 15
97 Bowling Green State University 20 18
97 Calvin College 20 17
97 Kansas State University 20 12
97 Pennsylvania State University at 
 University Park 20 5
97 Trinity University (Tex.) 20 17
97 University of Richmond 20 12
97 Whitman College 20 16
